Predicting Financial Crisis in Developing Economies: Astronomy or Astrology?

In the aftermath of the European currency crisis of 1992-3, the Mexican financial crisis of 1994-5 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8, neoclassical economists in the academy and policy community have been engaged in a project to develop predictors or indicators of currency, banking and generalized financial crises in developing economies. This paper critically examines the efforts of the economics profession in this regard on both empirical and theoretical grounds. The paper argues that these predictors perform poorly on empirical grounds--indeed, the predictors developed after each of these crises failed to predict the next major crisis. These predictors are also rejected on theoretical grounds. From a post-Keynesian perspective, there is no reason to expect that the mere provision of information will prevent crises by changing agents' behaviors. The paper will also propose several indicators that are consonant with post-Keynesian economic theory, although it will be argued that these indicators do not represent a sufficient means to prevent financial crisis. Ironically, as agents develop confidence in the predictive capacity of crisis indicators, they may engage in actions that increase the economy's vulnerability to crisis. Far more important to the project of preventing financial crisis in developing economies is the implementation of constraints on those investor behaviors that render liberalized, internationally integrated financial systems inherently prone to instability and crisis. Hence, intellectual capital would be more productively expended on devising appropriate changes in the overall regime in which investors operate (such as measures that compel changes in financing strategies) rather than in searching for new predictors of crisis.Financial Crisis

Promising Avenues, False Starts and Dead Ends: Global Governance and Development Finance in the Wake of the Crisis

Grabel addresses three related questions. How is the crisis affecting the governance of the IMF and the influence that developing countries have within the institution; the policy space available to developing countries; and the prospects that alternative financial architectures will emerge as competitors or complements to the Fund? At this point it appears that IMF practice on capital controls has changed partly as a consequence of the crisis, that relatively autonomous developing countries are taking advantage of the policy space that has emerged, and that the global financial architecture is becoming more heterogeneous and multi-nodal. Developing countries do not yet enjoy more formal influence at the IMF as a consequence of the crisis. However, it is premature to conclude now that the formal and informal influence of developing countries will not increase in the coming years.Global financial crisis; policy space for development; International Monetary Fund; capital controls; regional financial governance; global governance

TRIP WIRES AND SPEED BUMPS: MANAGING FINANCIAL RISKS AND REDUCING THE POTENTIAL FOR FINANCIAL CRISES IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

This paper investigates the shortcomings of the “early warning systems” (EWS) that are currently being promoted with such vigour in the multilateral and academic community. It then advocates an integrated “trip wire-speed bump” regime to reduce financial risk and, as a consequence, to reduce the frequency and depth of financial crises in developing countries. Specifically, this paper achieves four objectives. First, it demonstrates that efforts to develop EWS for banking, currency and generalized financial crises in developing countries have largely failed. It argues that EWS have failed because they are based on faulty theoretical assumptions, not least that the mere provision of information can reduce financial turbulence in developing countries. Second, the paper advances an approach to managing financial risks through trip wires and speed bumps. Trip wires are indicators of vulnerability that can illuminate the specific risks to which developing economies are exposed. Among the most significant of these vulnerabilities are the risk of large-scale currency depreciations, the risk that domestic and foreign investors and lenders may suddenly withdraw capital, the risk that locational and/or maturity mismatches will induce debt distress, the risk that non-transparent financial transactions will induce financial fragility, and the risk that a country will suffer the contagion effects of financial crises that originate elsewhere in the world or within particular sectors of their own economies. It argues that trip wires must be linked to policy responses that alter the context in which investors operate. In this connection, policymakers should link specific speed bumps that change behaviours to each type of trip wire. Third, the paper argues that the proposal for a trip wire-speed bump regime is not intended as a means to prevent all financial instability and crises in developing countries. Indeed, such a goal is fanciful. But insofar as developing countries remain highly vulnerable to financial instability, it is critical that policymakers vigorously pursue avenues for reducing the financial risks to which their economies are exposed and for curtailing the destabilizing effects of unpredictable changes in international private capital flows. Fourth, the paper responds to likely concerns about the response of investors, the IMF and powerful governments to the trip wire-speed bump approach. The paper also considers the issue of technical/institutional capacity to pursue this approach to policy. The paper concludes by arguing that the obstacles confronting the trip wire-speed bump approach are not insurmountable.

Financial Policy

.Financial Policy, Economic Policies, MDGs, Poverty, Pro-Poor Growth, Training, Programme, Research

Post-American Moments in Contemporary Global Financial Governance

It is difficult to find much to celebrate about the current conjuncture, marked as it is by deeply destructive incoherence. The best that can be said is that we are in an interregnum. But I suggest that today’s incoherence also includes productive and even transformative moments. I argue that incoherence in global financial governance should be understood as productive in several respects. It is creating and widening alternative spaces in which some of the values, practices, tools, objectives, and goals associated with embedded liberalism can be rearticulated in a world in which there is no “order,” American-led or otherwise. The silver lining of incoherence is that it creates space for experimentation and innovation unconstrained by an overarching “ism.” Incoherence is creating exits or leakages from noxious national and global policy environments, rendering it less poisonous than it would be in the absence of ideational aperture and contestation, competing policies, institutions, networks, and poles of power. The abdication by the US of its traditional role of global coordination and discipline, as exerted under the post-war embedded liberal or the neoliberal American-led orders, is creating opportunities for more permissive and varied “reembededness” and diverse forms of economic integration. The emerging regime reflects neither your grandmother’s American-led order 1.0 or 2.0. In this morbid post- American interregnum there is no singular “ism” or “alternative order,” a fact that I do not mourn

Capital Controls in a Time of Crisis

The startling resuscitation of capital controls during the global crisis has substantially widened policy space in the global north and south. The paper highlights five factors that contribute to the evolving rebranding of capital controls. These include: (1) the rise of increasingly autonomous developing states, largely as a consequence of their successful response to the Asian crisis; (2) the increasing confidence and assertiveness of their policymakers in part as a consequence of their relative success in responding to the global crisis at a time when many advanced economies have and still are stumbling; (3) a pragmatic adjustment by the IMF to an altered global economy in which the geography of its influence has been severely restricted; (4) the intensification of the need for capital controls during the crisis not just by countries facing fragility or implosion, but also by those that fared “too well”; and (5) the evolution in the ideas of academic economists and IMF staff. The paper explores tensions around the rebranding of capital controls. These are exemplified by efforts to develop a hierarchy in which controls on inflows that are a last resort and are targeted, temporary, and non-discriminatory are more acceptable than those that are blunt, enduring, discriminatory, and that target outflows. In addition, tensions have increasingly focused on whether controls should be used by capital-source rather than just capital-recipient countries

The Global Financial Governance Architecture, Developmental Finance, and the Hirschmanian Mindset

I advance three claims in the paper. The first claim is positive. The Asian and especially the global financial crisis occasioned meaningful though ad hoc, partial, and uneven discontinuities in developmental finance and financial governance architecture. The conjunction of discontinuities and continuities is imparting incoherence to the financial governance architecture and developmental finance. The second claim is normative. I hold, contrary to the common narrative, that the emergent incoherence is productive rather than debilitating. In the absence of an over-arching, coherent model of financial governance EMDEs today are experiencing a dramatic expansion in policy space and room for institutional experimentation. Especially in comparison with the stultifying coherence of the neoliberal era, EMDEs enjoy a degree of autonomy to pursue economic and human development and to introduce reforms that promote financial stability, resilience in the face of disturbances, and financial inclusion. Emergent redundancy and networks of institutional cooperation are increasing resilience. The third claim is that productive incoherence can be understood most fully within a “Hirschmanian mindset,” i.e., an understanding of social and regime change informed by Albert O. Hirschman’s key theoretical and epistemic commitments. The Hirschmanian vision that underpins the paper’s central theses recognizes that meaningful change can and should come about through the proliferation of small scale, disconnected, experimental, and incremental adjustments in institutions and practices that take root in the concrete demands facing policymakers with the capacity to adjust pragmatically to the changing circumstances and challenges they face

When Things Don't Fall Apart

An account of the significant though gradual, uneven, disconnected, ad hoc, and pragmatic innovations in global financial governance and developmental finance induced by the global financial crisis. In When Things Don't Fall Apart, Ilene Grabel challenges the dominant view that the global financial crisis had little effect on global financial governance and developmental finance. Most observers discount all but grand, systemic ruptures in institutions and policy. Grabel argues instead that the global crisis induced inconsistent and ad hoc discontinuities in global financial governance and developmental finance that are now having profound effects on emerging market and developing economies. Grabel's chief normative claim is that the resulting incoherence in global financial governance is productive rather than debilitating. In the age of productive incoherence, a more complex, dense, fragmented, and pluripolar form of global financial governance is expanding possibilities for policy and institutional experimentation, policy space for economic and human development, financial stability and resilience, and financial inclusion. Grabel draws on key theoretical commitments of Albert Hirschman to cement the case for the productivity of incoherence. Inspired by Hirschman, Grabel demonstrates that meaningful change often emerges from disconnected, erratic, experimental, and inconsistent adjustments in institutions and policies as actors pragmatically manage in an evolving world. Grabel substantiates her claims with empirically rich case studies that explore the effects of recent crises on networks of financial governance (such as the G-20); transformations within the IMF; institutional innovations in liquidity support and project finance from the national to the transregional levels; and the “rebranding” of capital controls. Grabel concludes with a careful examination of the opportunities and risks associated with the evolutionary transformations underway

The Political Economy of Remittances: What Do We Know? What Do We Need to Know?

Private remittances are becoming an increasingly important part of the financial landscape of many developing countries. Indeed, for some such countries, these flows are the single most important type of international capital inflow—public or private--and they have become an importance source of purchasing power and foreign exchange.� The growing importance of remittances has stimulated a great deal of discussion among scholars and policymakers.� However, most studies tend to be rather narrow and microeconomic in scope, and fail to understand remittances within a broader political economy context. This contrasts with studies of other international capital flows such as official development assistance, direct foreign investment, private bank loans, and portfolio investment where political economy concerns have long been a central concern.� This paper draws together findings from the rapidly growing multi-disciplinary study of remittances; identifies what we know, what we do not yet know, and what we still need to know about their economic, political and social consequences; and argues that there are a range of important political economy concerns raised by these flows. The paper concludes that the political economy effects of remittances are complex, contradictory, and not amenable to generalizations across the developing world, and that there is still much that we need to know about them.�